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1. Introduction 
The issues of agency costs that are mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976) have 
attracted major attention of many scholars around the world (e.g., Ang, Cole, & Lin, 
2000; Singh & Davidson, 2003; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Belghitar & Clark, 2015; and 
Rossi, Barth & Cebula, 2018). Most of these studies have a common assumption that 
the agency costs have a negative impact on firm performance. This paper aims to test 
this assumption by investigating the impact of agency costs on firm performance using 
alternative econometric techniques. In addition, different from previous studies that 
focus on the U.S. market, our sample is restricted to Vietnam listed companies. While 
the U.S. has a developed financial market that helps the U.S. companies to access the 
bond market and therefore rely less on banks’ loan, Vietnam has a less developed fi-
nancial market, which causes the Vietnamese companies to rely substantially on banks. 
Besides, agency problem and its influence on firm performance are still inadequately 
investigated in Vietnam, despite the fact that Vietnamese listed firms appear to have an 
underdeveloped corporate governance system, which gives way for more agency costs 
to incur. According to IFC’s study in 2012, none of the investigated Vietnamese firms 
achieved satisfactory corporate governance balance score-card results, and Vietnamese 
firms had much lower scores than firms of Thailand, Hong Kong and the Philippines in 
previous years. In fact, even though it is a common practice for Vietnamese listed com-
panies to have their CEOs as their general director (which means the representative of 
shareholders takes on the role of the top manager), it does not mean these companies 
can completely avoid agency costs. This is because these principal shareholders/top 
managers possess private information that is unavailable to other stockholders and have 
the potential to use it for their own benefit at the expense of other stockholders, which 
can elevate the agency problem. 
By investigating 736 Vietnamese listed companies during the period from 2010 to 
2015, we find that agency costs have a negative impact on firm performance. Specifically, 
our results show that one standard deviation increase in agency costs can decrease firm 
performance, measured by return on assets, by an amount from 22% to 59%. This result 
is robust to alternative econometric models, including an instrumental variables tech-
nique and a system generalized method of moment model. We also show that the nega-
tive impact of agency costs on firm performance is mitigated by the use of debt financing. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. Firstly, this paper confirms 
the validity of the assumption that assumes that the agency costs have a negative impact 
on firm performance. Secondly, we provide empirical evidence that a firm’s debt can 
be a useful instrument to ameliorate the negative impact of the agency costs on firm 
performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the litera-
ture review of agency costs and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents our data 
and methodology. Our empirical results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Agency costs are first mentioned in Berle and Means (1932). They argue that when there 
is a separation between management and ownership in a company, the manager who acts 
as the agent of the company will have the motivation and opportunity to conduct activ-
ities that serve their own interest instead of maximizing the value of the owners’ wealth. 
Thereafter, many studies attempt to investigate the agency problem in corporate govern-
ance by developing theoretical frameworks for analyzing agency costs (e.g., Ross, 1973; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Leland, 1998). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency costs occur due to the incomplete 
contractual relationship between the shareholders (the principal) and the managers (the 
agent). They mention that the agency costs include three types of costs. The first cost is 
the expenses incurred by the owners to monitor the activities of the agents, including the 
expenses for examining, firing agents or binding compensation contract for them. The 
second cost is the bonding expenditure to create a mechanism to ensure that the owners 
will be compensated sufficiently when the agents conduct activities causing damages to 
their benefit. The final cost, which is named residual loss, is the relevant expenses in-
curred due to the conflict of interest between the principal and agents. 
Given that it is difficult to measure agency costs, some studies attempt to propose 
several proxies for agency costs. Ang et al. (2000) measure the agency costs by the ratio 
of operating expenses to annual sales and by the ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
They argue that the first ratio indicates how effectively the company’s manager controls 
operating expenses that include the agency costs. A high ratio of operating expenses 
over annual sales is associated with high agency costs. The second ratio, asset utilization 
ratio, measures how effectively the company’s manager uses its assets. A higher ratio of 
asset utilization indicates more efficient use of assets, and therefore this ratio is inverse-
ly related to the agency costs. 
Extending the study of Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) also propose 
two measures of agency costs. Their first measure of agency costs is similar to the one 
of Ang et al. (2000), which is the asset utilization ratio. However, their second measure 
is slightly different from the ratio of operating expenses to annual sales as in Ang et al. 
(2000). They use a ratio of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expense to total 
sales as the second proxy for agency costs. They argue that this measure is better to re-
flect “managerial discretion in spending company resources” (Singh & Davison (2003), 
p. 799) than the counterpart measure in Ang et al. (2000). A higher ratio of SG&A 
expense to total sales indicates higher agency costs. Following the studies of Ang et al. 
(2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003), other studies also use the two proxies men-
tioned above (e.g., Fleming, Heaney, & McCosker, 2005; Florackis, 2008; McKnight & 
Weir, 2009; Rashid, 2013; Rossi et al., 2018). 
A growing body of literature has investigated the relationship between agency costs 
and ownership structure or board structure, and between ownership structure or the 
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board structure and firm performance (e.g., Ang et al., 2000; Singh & Davidson, 2003; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Fleming et al., 2005; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Margaritis 
& Psillaki, 2010; Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; Black & Kim, 2012; Liu, Miletkov, 
Wei, & Yang, 2015; Chen, 2015). On the one hand,  the ownership structure that is 
associated with low agency costs can lead to the increase of firm performance. For ex-
ample, an increase in the size of the board of directors is associated with a decrease in 
corporate performance because agency problems become more severe in a company 
with the larger board of directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Black and Kim (2012) 
and Liu et al. (2015) mention that independent boards can mitigate agency problem 
and therefore increase firm performance.
 On the other hand, several studies document an increase in firm performance when 
the firm has an ownership structure that is associated with high agency costs. For in-
stance, Ang et al. (2000) find that agency costs are higher in a company that is under 
management of the outsider rather than the insider. Then Chen (2015) shows that an 
increase in the number of outsiders managing the firm can improve the firm perfor-
mance; ownership concentration that has a positive relationship with agency costs 
(Rossi et al., 2018) can also have a positive relationship with firm performance (Mar-
garitis & Psillaki, 2010). Taken together, the empirical studies mentioned above do not 
reach the same conclusion on the impact of agency costs on firm performance.
In emerging markets of Asia, the influence of agency problem and/or corporate gov-
ernance on firm performance has been addressed in several recent studies. However, 
very few of them directly tackled agency cost in the form of an observable account-
ing-based measure. Research by Yao and Wu (2014) was probably the only notable pa-
per following such approach which empirically proved negative effect of agency cost 
on firm performance, but its research scope is limited to only one industry (insurance) 
in China. Other papers investigated firm performance or firm value effect of different 
corporate governance’s aspects such as the board of directors independence, ownership 
structure or even capital structure in various contexts, e.g., China (Xiao & Zhao, 2011; 
Chen & Jia, 2015), India (Shrivastav & Hagendorff, 2016; Arora & Sharma, 2016; Mo-
han & Chandramohan, 2018), Malaysia ( Jakpar et al., 2019; Jamaludin et al., 2018; 
P. Bhatt & R. Bhatt, 2017; Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012; Zabri et al., 2016),  Indonesia (Herd-
jiono & Sari, 2017; Malelak & Basana, 2015), Thailand (Detthamrong et al., 2017; Hsu 
& Petchsakulwong, 2010) the Philippines (Mohammadpoor & Teehankee, 2014), but 
almost none of them integrated an accounting-based measure of agency costs in re-
search model to directly test its effect on firm performance and value (though agency 
costs might somehow be involved in the discussions of these papers as a integral part of 
explaining corporate governance’s affecting mechanism on firm performance and firm 
value). Therefore, the literature on the influence of agency costs on firm performance 
suggests a considerable research gap for emerging markets in Asia.
Based on the underlying assumption that agency costs exert a negative impact on 
firm performance ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976), we  develop the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The increase in agency costs can reduce firm performance.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention that a debt instrument can be a useful tool to 
monitor agency costs. The increase of the company’s debt ratio will put more stress on 
its manager because he has to pay more interest expenses and debt principal in the fu-
ture. As a result, he needs to avoid inefficient investment in order to preserve the ability 
to meet debt obligation. This may help to reduce the conflict between the company’s 
shareholders and managers and thus reduce the agency costs between them. Based on 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), we predict that the company’s debt instrument can re-
duce the negative impact of agency costs on firm performance. Our second hypothesis 
is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The firm’s leverage can reduce the negative impact of agency costs on firm 
performance. 
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Our sample contains 736 Vietnam listed companies during the period from 2010 to 
2015. The financial data is sourced from STOCKPLUS database.1 These companies, 
which do not include financial companies and utilities companies, are classified into 
8 industries based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The final sample is a 
balanced data set consisting of 4.416 firm-year observations. 
3.2. Research methodology
To examine the impact of agency costs on firm performance, panel data analysis is em-
ployed. A notable advantage of this method is that it can remedy the absence of un-
observable characteristics of each company. Specifically, the four following models are 
estimated:
ROAit = β1 + β2 SALE_ASSETit + β3 lnTAit + β4 LEVERAGEit + β5 Ageit  + εit  (1)
ROAit = β1 + β2 SGA_SALEit + β3 lnTAit + β4 LEVERAGEit + β5 Ageit  + φit  (2)
ROEit = β1 + β2 SALE_ASSETit + β3 lnTAit + β4 LEVERAGEit + β5 Ageit  + γit  (3)
ROEit = β1 + β2 SGA_SALEit + β3 lnTAit + β4 LEVERAGEit + β5 Ageit  + ηit  (4)
where i indexes company and t indexes year. 
1 StockPlus Corporate provides financial information of all listed companies in Vietnam. 
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Our dependent variables are ROA in Equations 1 and 2, and ROE in Equation 3 
and 4, respectively. ROA is calculated as the ratio of income after tax to total assets, 
while ROE is measured as the ratio of income after tax to total equity. We follow Ang 
et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003) and use the ratio of net sales to total 
assets (SALE_ASSET) and the ratio of SG&A expenses (SGA_SALE) to net sales as 
the proxy for agency costs. The first proxy for agency costs, SALE_ASSET, is a measure 
of asset utilization that evaluates the efficiency of assets. The second proxy for agen-
cy costs, SGA_SALE, captures the manager’s ability to control the SG&A expenses, 
whereas a high ratio of SALE_ASSET implies low agency costs, a high ratio of SGA_
SALE alludes to high agency costs. 
We also include a set of control variables in our model based on the literature on the 
determinants of firm performance in emerging countries (e.g., Chen, 2015; Liu et al., 
2015; Arora & Sharma, 2016). Specifically, we control firm size (lnTA), leverage (LEV-
ERAGE), and firm age (AGE). The definition of these control variables is presented in 
Table 1. 
Finally, ε, φ, γ, and η are the error terms in Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
We include the industry dummy variables and year dummy variables in our model to 
capture the industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. The standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. All variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to remove the impact of outliers. Our coefficients 
of interest are the coefficients estimated on SALE_ASSET and SGA_SALE, which are 
expected to have positive and negative value, respectively. 
TABLE 1. Definition of variables
Variable Description of calculation 
Dependent variable
ROA Profit after tax / Total assets
ROE Profit after tax / Total equity
Independent variables
SALE_ASSET Net sales / Total asset
SGA_SALE SG&A expense / Net sales 
Control variables 
lnTA Natural logarithm of total assets
LEVERAGE Total debt / Total assets
AGE The number of years since the firm’s establishment
This table presents the definition of variables employed in our paper. 
Given that our data is the panel data, we can estimate Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 by a 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, a random effects (RE) model, or a fixed 
effects (FE) model. To choose an appropriate model between the pooled OLS model, 
the RE model, or the FE model, Wooldridge (2010) proposes employing the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and the Hausman test. However, since the Haus-
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man test cannot be used when standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the firm level, we employ a test of overidentifying restrictions to choose 
between RE model and FE model (Schaffer & Stillman, 2010). After using the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and the test of overidentifying restrictions, the FE 
model should be used to estimate Equations 1 and 2.2 As a result, we only report the 
results estimated from the FE model in this paper.3 
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our study. The mean of 
SALE_ASSET and SGA_SALE is 1.209 and 0.038, respectively. These numbers for 
Vietnamese companies are lower than those for the US counterparts in Singh and Da-
vidson (2003), who show that SALE_ASSET and SGA_SALE have the mean value 
of 1.430 and 0.279, respectively. Regarding the profitability, the mean of ROA in our 
sample is 0.0511, which is similar to 0.0516 in the US study (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
However, compared with the US companies, the companies in our sample have higher 
leverage. The mean of leverage in our sample is 0.523, whereas the corresponding num-
ber in Singh and Davidson (2003) is 0.190. Overall, our setting is substantially different 
from the US setting, which suggests that it may be necessary to investigate the agency 
costs in Vietnam. 
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
ROA 4416 0.051 0.078 -0.214 0.320
ROE 4416 0.101 0.191 -1.001 0.687
SALE_ASSET 4416 1.209 1.068 0.014 6.562
SGA_SALE 4416 0.038 0.052 0.000 0.264
lnTA 4416 26.726 1.440 23.770 30.681
LEVERAGE 4416 0.523 0.233 0.046 1.055
lnAGE 4416 2.909 0.685 1.386 4.043
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The definition of these variables 
is presented in Table 1. 
Table 3 provides a correlation matrix for the variables used in our study. The results 
show that all the correlation values between explanatory variables are below 0.7, which 
implies that our model does not have a multicollinearity problem. 
2 The p-values of Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and the test of overidentifying restrictions are 
0.000. 
3 A firm fixed effects model also captures the industry fixed effects. As a result, it is unnecessary to include the 
industry dummy variables in the firm fixed effects model.
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TABLE 3. Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) ROA 1.000
(2) ROE 0.669 1.000
(3) SALE_ASSET 0.216 0.198 1.000
(4) SGA_SALE 0.084 0.016 0.031 1.000
(5) lnTA -0.033 0.042 -0.193 -0.017 1.000
(6) LEVERAGE -0.441 -0.114 -0.002 -0.174 0.320 1.000
(7) AGE 0.044 0.047 0.154 0.067 0.023 0.102 1.000
This table provides the correlation matrix of the variables used in this paper. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
4.2. Multivariate results
Table 4 provides the results estimated from Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 using a firm fix 
effects model. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is ROA. In column 1, the 
estimated coefficient on SALE_ASSET is positive and significant at the 1% level, sug-
gesting that the high asset turnover ratio (low agency costs) is associated with the high 
firm performance. The economic impact of this variable is also large. One standard de-
viation increase in SALE_ASSET can make ROA increase by around 3.0 percentage 
point (=1.068 * 0.028). This number is equal to approximate 59% of the mean of ROA 
in our sample. 
TABLE 4. Impact of agency costs on firm performance
 
Dependent variable
ROA ROE
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4)
SALE_ASSET 0.028*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.010)
SGA_SALE -0.221*** -0.576***
(0.045) (0.148)
lnASSET 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.074*** 0.059***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018)
LEVERAGE -0.175*** -0.188*** -0.174*** -0.207***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.056) (0.056)
lnAGE -0.012 -0.003 0.009 0.032
(0.013) (0.013) (0.033) (0.035)
Constant -0.733*** -0.552*** -1.909*** -1.454***
(0.148) (0.144) (0.489) (0.496)
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Dependent variable
ROA ROE
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Industry dummy NO NO NO NO
Year dummy YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.209 0.176 0.082 0.062
This table presents results from a fixed effects model. The dependent variable is ROA in columns 1 and 2 
and ROE in columns 3 and 4, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In column 2, the estimated coefficient on SGA_SALE is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, which may suggest that high managerial discretionary expense (high 
agency costs) is associated with low firm performance. Regarding the economic impact 
of SGA_SALE, one standard deviation increase in SGA_SALE can reduce ROA by 
around 1.1 percentage point (= 0.052 * 0.221), which corresponds to approximately 
22% of the mean of ROA in our sample. We find qualitatively similar results when the 
dependent variable is ROE (columns 3 and 4). Overall, our results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, which states that companies with low agency costs have higher perfor-
mance than those with high agency costs. 
With regard to control variables, the results show that the estimated coefficient on 
firm size is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that publicly listed compa-
nies in Vietnam can take advantage from economies of scale. In contrast, the coefficient 
on leverage is significantly negative. This can be explained by the fact that Vietnamese 
companies employ too much debt, resulting in such huge burden on paying interest 
expenses that they cannot get benefit from the tax shield, which can cause the reduction 
in the companies’ profitability.
4.3. Robustness checks
4.3.1. Lag model and instrumental variables technique
In this section, we attempt to deal with the concern that agency costs are endogenous 
in our model due to the reverse causality or omitted variables. In the first robustness 
check that can mitigate the reverse causality, we follow the methodology of Chen and 
King (2014) and estimate Equation 1 by a fixed effects model with the lag 1 year of the 
right-hand side variables. The results are reported in Table 5. The dependent variables 
are ROA in columns 1 and 2 and ROE in columns 5 and 6, respectively. The estimated 
coefficient on SALE_ASSET is still significantly positive albeit with a smaller magni-
tude. However, the coefficient on SGA_SALE is insignificant. 
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TABLE 5. Robustness tests - Lag model and instrumental variables technique
 
Dependent variable
ROA ROE
LAG IV LAG IV
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SALE_ASSET
0.013*** 0.072*** 0.038*** 0.126**
(0.004) (0.021) (0.011) (0.062)
SGA_ASSET
0.034 -0.622* -0.045 -0.611
(0.068) (0.345) (0.182) (1.042)
lnASSET
-0.023*** -0.025*** 0.040*** 0.025*** -0.068*** -0.073*** 0.084*** 0.059***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.018)
LEVERAGE
0.028 0.018 -0.150*** -0.184*** 0.258*** 0.230*** -0.142** -0.206***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.069) (0.070) (0.065) (0.055)
lnAGE
-0.001 0.001 -0.024* -0.001 0.047 0.053 -0.006 0.032
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.035)
Constant
0.647*** 0.703*** 1.603** 1.778**
(0.195) (0.198) (0.702) (0.711)
Observations 3,680 3,680 4,416 4,416 3,680 3,680 4,416 4,416
Industry dummy NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistic – 
p value
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F 
statistic
23.625 29.660 23.625 29.660
R-squared 0.041 0.033 0.103 0.148 0.034 0.028 0.065 0.062
This table presents results from a fixed effects model with the lag 1 year of independent and control variable 
in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, and from an instrumental variables model in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, respectively. 
In columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is ROA. In columns 5, 6, 7, and 8, the dependent variable 
is ROE. All variables are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In the second robustness check, we employ a two-stage least squares instrumental 
variables technique for panel data to address the omitted variables problem.4 The en-
dogenous variables will be regressed on the instrumental variables in the first stage re-
gression, and all of the independent variables in the second stage regression. Then, in the 
second stage regression, the dependent variable will be regressed on the predicted values 
of the endogenous variables, which are estimated from the first stage regression and all of 
the independent variables. The instruments need to have a strong relationship with the 
endogenous variables and not have a direct impact on the dependent variable. The first 
4  This can be implemented by the command xtivreg2 in STATA; xtivreg2 does not report a constant for a fixed 
effects model.
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instrumental variable we use in this paper is the mean of SALE_ASSET in each industry. 
This variable is the instrument for SALE_ASSET. For example, if company i operates in 
industry j in year t, the instruments of variable SALE_ASSET of company i in year t will 
take the value equal to the mean of SALE_ASSET of the industry j, which is calculated 
as the average value of SALE_ASSET of all companies in industry j in year t. In the same 
manner, we use the mean of SGA_SALE in each industry as the proxy for SGA_SALE. 
We report the results estimated from the two-stage least square instrumental vari-
ables technique in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Table 5. The p value of the underidentifi-
cation test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) is 0.000 in all the 4 columns, suggesting 
that the instruments are relevant. Additionally, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics 
are higher than 10 in all 4 columns, suggesting that the instruments are not weak. In 
columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ROA. The results confirm the significantly 
positive impact of SALE_ASSET and the significantly negative impact of SGA_SALE 
on ROA, respectively. In columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is ROE. Whereas the 
coefficient estimated on SALE_ASSET is significantly positive at the 5% level, the co-
efficient estimated on SGA_ASSET is insignificant. One of the reasons explaining the 
insignificant coefficient on SGA_SALE in columns 2, 6, and 8 is that SGA_SALE is not 
a good proxy for agency costs in Vietnam. In our sample, approximately 20% firm-year 
observation of this variable has the value of zero. Overall, our results from these robust-
ness checks are consistent with the previous finding that companies with lower agency 
costs have higher firm performance. 
4.3.2. Dynamic model
In this section, we further deal with the concern about the endogeneity problem by 
using the System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) technique.5 One of the 
advantages of this method is that it allows us to investigate the dynamic effects of firm 
performance. If a firm had a good performance in the previous year, it can also have a 
good performance in the current year. To examine this, we add the lag one year of the 
dependent variable to the right-hand side of Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4. Another advan-
tage of the SGMM model is that it is unnecessary to find any new instrumental variables 
for the endogenous variables in this model. In this method, the lag value of the endoge-
nous variables is used as the instruments for the endogenous variable. The results using 
SGMM model are reported in Table 6. 
The post-estimation tests confirm the validity of our model. The p value of the 
AR(2) test is higher than 0.1, suggesting that there is no autocorrelation of the second 
lags of the endogenous variables. In addition, the insignificance of the Hansen test in-
dicates that our instruments are valid instruments. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent 
variable is ROA. In column 1, the coefficient on SALE_ASSET is significantly positive 
at the 1% level, which is consistent with the result above. By contrast, the coefficient on 
5  See Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for an explanation of the SGMM model.
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SGA_SALE is insignificant. When the dependent variable is ROE, the results which are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 are qualitatively similar. As mentioned above, the fact that 
the coefficient on SGA_SALE is insignificant in this model can be explained because 
SGA_SALE is not an appropriate proxy for agency costs in Vietnam. Regarding the lag 
variable of the dependent variable in each model, we find that the coefficient estimated 
on these lag variables is positive and significant. This suggests that the previous year’s 
profitability can be positively associated with the current year’s profitability. 
TABLE 6. Robustness tests – Dynamic model
  Dependent variable
ROA ROE
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.ROA 0.435*** 0.604***
(0.088) (0.079)
L.ROE 0.255** 0.296***
(0.106) (0.103)
SALE_ASSET 0.026*** 0.069***
(0.009) (0.022)
SGA_SALE 0.195 0.086
(0.125) (0.396)
lnASSET 0.015* 0.004 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
LEVERAGE -0.068 -0.017 -0.052 -0.060
(0.044) (0.043) (0.122) (0.117)
lnAGE -0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant -0.377* -0.109 -1.565*** -1.520***
(0.195) (0.184) (0.550) (0.539)
Observations 3,680 3,680 3,680 3,680
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES
Year dummy YES YES YES YES
AR(1) test – p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test – p value 0.993 0.899 0.138 0.176
Hansen test – p value 0.565 0.400 0.278 0.424
This table presents results from a SGMM model. The dependent variable is ROA in columns 1 and 2, and 
ROE in columns 3 and 4, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 and are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4. Effect of leverage on the relationship between agency costs and firm performance
So far our paper has focused on the impact of agency costs on firm performance. We 
show that agency costs exert a negative impact on firm performance. Jensen (1986) 
shows that companies’ debt can mitigate the negative impact of agency costs. In this sec-
tion, we investigate the effects of leverage on the relationship between agency costs and 
firm performance by including the interaction term between the proxy of agency costs 
and the company’s leverage in Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4. Then we use a least squares dum-
my variables model to estimate these equations. The results are presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. The effect of leverage on the relationship between agency costs and firm performance
 
Dependent variable
ROA ROE
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
SALE_ASSET 0.038*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.014)
SALE_ASSET * LEVERAGE -0.018** 0.046
(0.009) (0.029)
SGA_SALE -0.257** -0.430
(0.116) (0.325)
SGA_SALE * LEVERAGE 0.070 -0.289
(0.203) (0.688)
lnASSET 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.072*** 0.059***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020)
LEVERAGE -0.154*** -0.190*** -0.226*** -0.197***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.077) (0.065)
lnAGE -0.011 -0.003 0.007 0.032
(0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.038)
Constant -0.768*** -0.550*** -1.823*** -1.463***
(0.160) (0.158) (0.532) (0.540)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Industry dummy NO NO NO NO
Year dummy YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.724 0.712 0.453 0.440
This table presents results from a least square dummy variables model. The dependent variable is ROA in 
columns 1 and 2, and ROE in columns 3 and 4, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 and are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is ROA. The coefficients of SALE_AS-
SET and SGA_SALE are still significantly positive and negative, respectively. In ad-
dition, the interaction term between SALE_ASSET and LEVERAGE is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the negative impact of agency costs on firm 
performance can be ameliorated when the company’s leverage is high. For example, if 
a firm does not use any debt, the reduction by one standard deviation in SALE_AS-
SET can lead to a decrease in ROA by 4.0 percentage points (=0.038*1.068). How-
ever, the magnitude of this decrease in ROA will decline by 1.0 percentage point 
(=0.018*0.523*1.068) if the company has a leverage of 0.523 (the mean of leverage 
in our sample). In unreported analysis, we find that the marginal effect of the firm’s 
leverage is significant and negative when SALE_ASSET is equal to the 5th percentile, 
50th percentile, or 95th percentile. This suggests that the costs of using debt, such as 
increasing the firm’s default risk, are much higher than the benefits of using debt, such 
as reducing the firm’s agency costs. Although we still find the significantly negative co-
efficient of SGA_SALE, its interaction term with LEVERAGE is insignificant. 
In contrast to the results with ROA as a dependent variable, we do not find any 
significant effect of leverage on the relationship between agency costs and firm perfor-
mance. Overall, we find evidence supporting our Hypothesis 2, which predicts that lev-
erage can mitigate the negative impact of agency costs on firm performance. Our result 
is similar to the result of McKnight and Weir (2009), who find that debt reduces agency 
costs. In addition, given that most of the debt in Vietnamese companies are funded by 
banks, our results corroborate the finding of Ang et al. (2000) that agency costs are 
lower with greater monitoring by banks. 
5. Conclusion 
When investigating the agency costs in corporate governance, most of the studies as-
sume that agency costs have a negative impact on firm performance ( Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Hermalin& Weisbach, 2003; Fleming et al., 2005; 
McKnight & Weir, 2009; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; 
Black & Kim, 2012; Liu et al., 2015; Chen, 2015). The aim of this paper is to investigate 
the relationship between agency costs and firm performance in Vietnam, which pro-
vides a different setting from the one in the U.S. in many aspects. 
Our sample consists of 736 Vietnamese listed public companies over the period 
from 2010 to 2015. Our results show that agency costs, measured by asset utilization 
ratio and SG&A expenses scaled by net sales, exert a negative impact on firm perfor-
mance, measured by return on assets and return on equity, suggesting that the assump-
tion mentioned above is valid. Additionally, we also find that the negative impact of 
agency costs on firm performance is ameliorated by increasing the firm’s debt. This re-
sult corroborates the argument of Jensen (1986) that firm’s debt is a useful instrument 
to monitor agency costs. 
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